Constitutional Law - First and Twenty-First Amendments by Lane, Richard C.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 12 Number 4 Article 16 
1974 
Constitutional Law - First and Twenty-First Amendments 
Richard C. Lane 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard C. Lane, Constitutional Law - First and Twenty-First Amendments, 12 Duq. L. Rev. 1008 (1974). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol12/iss4/16 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Duquesne Law Review
this case. At least two alternatives consistent with traditional first
amendment analysis were available. The first was an analysis of whether
the Human Relations Ordinance reflects a compelling governmental
interest, making regulation of the column headings allowable. Sec-
ondly, the Court could have concluded that the column headings repre-
sented conduct and not expression and thus were not protected by the
first amendment. Either would allow the Court a wider range of in-
quiry in order to insure greater protection of the exchange of ideas and
at the same time, permit governmental regulation where there is a
great societal need.
Ellen Edge Katz
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AND TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENTS-The
United States Supreme Court has held the regulations of the California
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control which prohibit certain
sexual acts and the display of specific parts of the body, as entertain-
ment in licensed establishments, do not, on their faces, violate the
United States Constitution.
California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
In 1965, a dancer in a California nightclub entertained with her breasts
exposed. The Supreme Court of California in In Re Giannini held
that she could not be convicted of either lewd conduct or indecent ex-
posure in the absence of proof that her dance was obscene. The Depart-
ment of Alcoholic Beverage Control, which is the administrative agency
vested by the California constitution2 with primary authority for li-
censing and regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages within the state,
became concerned in the years following Giannini with the progression
from "topless" dancers to "bottomless" dancers, nude entertainers, and
the showing of films displaying sexual acts in bars and nightclubs
1. 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, cert. denied, 395 US. 910 (1968).
2. CAL. CONsT. art. 20, § 22. That section provides in part:
The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control shall have the exclusive power, except
as herein provided and in accordance with the laws enacted by the Legislature, to
license the manufacture, importation and sales of alcoholic beverages in this State.
. . . The Department shall have the power, in its discretion, to deny, suspend, or
revoke any specific alcoholic beverages license if it shall determine for good cause that
the granting or continuance of such license would be contrary to public welfare or
morals ....
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which it had licensed. Public hearings were held and the commission
heard of numerous incidents which had occurred in and around li-
censed establishments offering such entertainment. These incidents
ranged from sexual contact between customers and dancers to acts of
violence against police and citizens which took place immediately ad-
jacent to these establishments.8 The commission also heard testimony
that statutory law had been unsuccessful in regulating this behavior
because of a series of state and federal court decisions.4 In 1970, the
Department promulgated rules regulating the type of entertainment
which might be presented in bars and nightclubs which it licensed.
Holders of various liquor licenses and dancers at premises operated by
such licensees brought an action in the United States district court,
challenging these regulations as being, on their faces, violative of the
first and fourteenth amendments. 5
The majority of the three judge district court held that portions of
the regulations were unconstitutional. It issued a declaratory judgment
to that effect, and granted an injunction prohibiting enforcement.
Those portions struck down by the court prohibited the following
kinds of conduct on licensed premises:
(a) The performance of acts, or simulated acts, of "sexual intercourse,
masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or any
sexual act which is prohibited by law;"
(b) The actual or simulated "touching, caressing or fondling of the
breasts, buttocks, anus, or genitals;"
(c) The actual or simulated "displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva
or genitals;"
(d) The permitting by a licensee of "any person to remain in or upon
the licensed premises who exposes to public view any portion or his or
her genitals or anus;" and, by a companion section,
(e) The displaying of films or pictures depicting acts a live performance
of which was prohibited by the regulations 6 quoted above.
The district court held that motion pictures and live performances
are within the free speech guarantees of the first and fourteenth amend-
3. California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 111 (1972).
4. Id. at 126 n.4.
5. La Rue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
6. For full text, see 326 F. Supp. at 358-60. Originally, rules prohibiting topless wait-
resses, entertainment which violated a city ordinance, and certain requirements that enter-
tainers perform on a stage were also challenged. These objections were withdrawn at oral
argument.
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ments.7 It therefore reasoned that the regulations had to be justified
under the Roth-Memoirs8 line of decisions as a prohibition of obscen-
ity, or else as a regulation of conduct having a communicative element,
in accordance with the standards set forth in United States v. O'Brien.9
Finding that these regulations would bar some entertainment which"
could not be held legally obscene, and that the O'Brien tests were not
satisfied, the court held that as direct prohibitions the regulations were
overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. Relying primarily on Sher-
bert v. Verner'° and American Communications Association v. Douds,"
the court further concluded that California could not do indirectly
that which it could not do directly; in this case, a state agency could
not use its constitutional power to issue, renew, or revoke liquor li-
censes for the purpose of censoring entertainment.' 2 The state appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.'3
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court and
upheld the regulations. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist held that both motion pictures and theatrical performances are
within the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. He
agreed with the district court that these regulations proscribed both
visual entertainment which is not protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments because it is obscene, and visual entertainment which
would not be found obscene under Roth and subsequent decisions of
the Court, and is therefore protected. But the Court did not believe
that the state regulatory authority in this case was limited to dealing
with the problem it confronted in terms of obscenity. Justice Rehn-
quist said that as the mode of expression moves from the printed page
7. Id. at 353-55.
8. In A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachu-
setts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). ". . . [I]t must be es-
tablished that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts con-
temporary community standards to the description or representation of sexual matters;
and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value." 326 F. Supp. at 353. Since
the La Rue decision, the Court has re-examined the rules for determining obscenity. See
United States v. 12 200-ft Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115
(1973); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973. These decisions do not directly affect the holding of La Rue.
9. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). (1) It must be within the constitutional power of the govern-
mental agency; (2) It must further an important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
The governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(4) The incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 326 F. Supp. at 355.
10. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
11. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
12. 326 F. Supp. at 357-58.
13. California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
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to involve conduct or action, the Court has often sustained limitations
upon the time, manner, and place of such exercise of first amendment
rights. 14
The twenty-first amendment 15 was cited by the Court as conferring
upon the states something more than the general police powers in
matters involving the sale of alcoholic beverages. It was not held that
the twenty-first amendment supercedes all other provisions of the Con-
stitution in matters concerning the control of liquor, but the Court
did indicate that the case for upholding a state regulation in this area
is strengthened by that enactment. 6
Justice Rehnquist said that the Department perceived a situation of.
legitimate concern which involved the sale of alcoholic beverages by
the drink. It concluded that the sale of liquor by the drink and naked
dancing and entertainment should not take place simultaneously. The
Court held that this conclusion was not irrational.'7 Considering the
wide latitude provided by the twenty-first amendment for the states in
dealing with problems related to liquor, and the lack of a showing that
lesser restrictions would have been effective to alleviate the problem,
the Court concluded that the Department's choice of a prophylactic
solution was a reasonable one.
The standards announced in United States v. O'Brien8 for dealing
with some forms of communicative conduct were held not to be appli-
cable to La Rue. Justice Rehnquist said that the Court in O'Brien sug-
gested that the extent to which conduct was protected by the first
amendment depended on the presence of a communicative element.
He characterized the performances at which these regulations were
directed as "more gross sexuality than communication.'19 While he
conceded that at least some of the performances prohibited by these
regulations would contain sufficient communicative elements to be
afforded constitutional protection in another setting, he saw as the
critical factor that California had not forbidden these performances
across the board. It merely proscribed such performances in establish-
ments which it licensed to sell liquor by the drink.20
14. Id. at 116-17.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2, provides: "The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of in-
toxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
16. 409 U.S. at 115-16.
17. Id.
18. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
19. 409 U.S. at 118.
20. Id. at 117-18.
1011
Duquesne Law Review
The Court held, therefore, that the conclusion that certain sexual
performances and the sale of liquor by the drink ought not to occur
simultaneously was not irrational; and, given the added presumption
in favor of validity of state regulation in this area which the Court
found the twenty-first amendment to require, the Court held that the
regulations were not on their faces violative of the Constitution. As a
qualifying footnote to his opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist added, quot-
ing from Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter,21 "Although it is
possible that specific future applications of the statute may engender
concrete problems of constitutional dimension, it will be time enough
to consider any such problems when they arise. 22
Mr. Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, stated that he would
affirm the decision of the district court. In his view, activities which are
entitled to prima facie first amendment protection may be regulated
in only the following ways:
(a) A state may restrict speech if it can show that the speech is "used
in such circumstances and is of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that it will bring about the substantive evils that [the
state] has a right to prevent." 23
(b) If a protected activity is obscene, it is no longer protected, and can
be regulated by the state.24
(c) A state may enact a broad regulatory scheme which incidentally
restricts first amendment rights. As long as the regulation is not speech
related, and is otherwise constitutional, it is permissible. 25
(d) The states may, in some circumstances, enact regulatory schemes
that directly restrict the exercise of free speech or protected conduct.
To be constitutional, such regulation must be supported by a "com-
pelling" governmental purpose. That purpose must be unrelated to a
mere hostility to the right being asserted and classifications which are
based on the content of speech are especially disfavored by the Court.26
As a prohibition of obscenity, Justice Marshall found the California
regulations to be overbroad, and therefore unconstitutional. The regu-
lations created a system of per se rules to be applied regardless of con-
text; they flatly prohibited performance of certain acts and the exposure
21. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
22. 409 U.S. at 119 n.5, quoting 384 U.S. at 52.
23. 409 U.S. at 119, citing Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); cf. Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
24. 409 U.S. at 119 n.9.
25. Id. at 137-38.
26. Id. at 138.
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of certain parts of the body in entertainment that was presented in bars
and nightclubs.27
The state argued that what was being denied here was not the right
to present constitutionally protected entertainment, but the privilege
of selling liquor by the drink in connection therewith. Californians
were free to present the entertainment without criminal sanction. Even
Justice Marshall conceded that California could have denied or re-
voked liquor licenses for any number of reasons. There were some
reasons, however, for which a privilege may not be denied. In his view,
a benefit may not be denied a person by a state on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests-especially his freedom of
speech.28 Cases in which unconstitutional conditions on welfare bene-
fits, 29 unemployment compensation,"° tax exemptions, 3 1 public em-
ployment8 2 bar admissions,83 and mailing privileges34 have been
invalidated were cited by Justice Marshall. In none of these were
criminal penalties involved.
As a regulation on the time, place or manner of the exercise of first
amendment rights, Justice Marshall considered that the constitutionally
permissible purpose to be served by the restrictions was too remote to
be considered compelling. The evils of which the commission heard
in the hearings could be prohibited directly. In his view, the state must
adopt this less restrictive alternative unless it can make a demonstra-
tion that the protected activity and the criminal conduct are so closely
linked that only through restriction of one can the other be stopped.
He could find no such demonstration in the instant case. In effect,
Justice Marshall did not find the sweep of the twenty-first amendment
so broad as did the majority. He saw that amendment as giving the
states no power to regulate liquor in a fashion that would otherwise
be unconstitutional, except in those areas relating to importation. The
27. Id. at 123-26.
28. Id. at 136, citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
29. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); but cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971).
30. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
32. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1960).
33. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S.
252 (1957); Schare v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). But cf. Law Students
Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36 (1961).
34. See, e.g., Blout v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S.
146 (1946).
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twenty-first amendment granted to the states no more than the right to
regulate the interstate commerce of this one item, alcoholic beverages.
He said that recent decisions of the Court indicate that the power to
regulate the distribution of alcohol may not be used in a manner
inconsistent with the equal protection clause35 or the requirements of
due process. 36 He could find no justification for the proposition that it
could be exercised in a manner that conflicted with the first amend-
ment.
Mr. Justice Marshall was startled at the majority's suggestion that the
regulations were constitutional on their faces even though specific
future applications may engender concrete problems of constitutional
dimensions. What the Department sought to prevent by the rules was
irrelevant to him; the fact was that they prohibited both protected
and unprotected performances. On the basis of this overbreadth, Justice
Marshall would have held the regulations unconstitutional.37
The Supreme Court's decision in La Rue has major significance in
three respects. First, it marks a substantial broadening of the scope of
the twenty-first amendment. Second, the Court for the first time held
directly that theatrical performances and dance are entitled to prima
facie first amendment protection. Finally, the Court's approach to the
problem of possible statutory overbreadth indicates that the recent
trend in the use of the overbreadth doctrine is undergoing re-exami-
nation.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 3 8
The twenty-first amendment was based on the existing Webb-Kenyon
Act 9 for the purpose of permanently embedding in the Constitution
the principles of that act. That purpose was to divest the importation
of liquor of its interstate commerce protections in certain circum-
stances, so as to allow dry states to regulate the flow of liquors across
their borders. This had the effect of giving dry states federal protection
against importation of liquor into the states.4°
35. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972).
36. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
37. 409 U.S. at 125 n.3.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2, provides: "The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of in-
toxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
39. Act of March 1, 1913, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699.
40. 409 U.S. at 134 n.14.
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Notwithstanding the amendment's stated purpose, the first Supreme
Court case to interpret the twenty-first amendment, State Board of
Equalization v. Young's Market Co.,41 held that it granted the states
plenary power over liquor, and upheld an otherwise invalid state
license tax upon importers of beer from other states. The Court there
said that the words of the amendment grant to the state the power to
prohibit all importation of alcohol, and that the state may adopt a
lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition. In Mahoney v.
Joseph Triner Corp.,42 the Court declared that the state's power over
importation was plenary, even to the extent of unreasonableness.
Ziffrin v. Reeves43 held that a state may exercise wide discretion as to
the means employed in protecting her people against the evil incidents
of liquor. There, the Court reasoned that a state may prohibit liquor
totally within its borders, and may adopt what measures are appro-
priate to effectuate that end. The state may also adopt as a regulation
something less than total prohibition, so it is therefore permissible for
the state to allow the transportation, possession, sale, manufacture, or
consumption of alcohol only under definitely prescribed conditions.
In 1963, the Court limited the twenty-first amendment's supercession
of the commerce clause to situations in which state laws regulate the
importation of intoxicants destined for use or consumption within
the state; 44 and, in 1966, the Court reiterated the fact that the twenty-
first amendment granted to the states broad regulatory power over
liquor traffic within their borders, and that the states in so doing were
totally unconfined by traditional commerce clause limitations.45
In examining state regulation of liquor with respect to constitutional
requirements other than the commerce clause, however, the Court
has found the twenty-first amendment to be of little import. As pointed
out by Justice Marshall, the general state police power to regulate
matters concerning liquor, it has been held, may not be exercised in
a manner that conflicts with the equal protection clause or the require-
ments of due process.46 Neither may it be exercised in a manner con-
41. 299 U.S. 59 (1936.
42. 304 U.S. 401 (1937).
43. 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
44. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1963).
45. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 348 U.. 35 (1966). See generally 17 VAND.
L. REv. 1524 (1964); 55 YALE L.J. 815 (1946).
46. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972); Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). But cf. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). A Michigan
statute required that all bartenders in cities of 50,000 population or more be licensed.
The statute prohibited any female from obtaining such a license, however, unless she was
1015
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flicting with the export-import clause 47 nor to prevent shipment of
liquor to a federal compound totally within the borders of the state .4
The majority in. La Rue did not hold that the twenty-first amend-
ment empowered a state to do that which the first amendment pro-
hibits. It did hold, however, that the twenty-first amendment gives
rise to a presumption in favor of the validity of regulation in this
area.49 This presumption was apparently sufficient to alter the scope
of the Court's inquiry into a state action which restricted the exercise
of free speech rights. Rather than requiring the state to make a showing
of a "compelling governmental interest" to support such restriction,
the Court upheld the regulation merely upon a showing of reasonable-
ness.50
II. THE SCOPE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The first amendment provides, in part, that ". . . Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or the press.. .. "
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects citizens
of each state from unwarranted state interference with the exercise of
first amendment rights. These protections have been interpreted by
the Court to apply to forms of expression other than pure speech and
the printed page. Proceeding on a case-by-case basis, the Court has
included within the protection of the first amendment motion pic-
tures,51 symbolic speech, 52 labor picketing,53 and protest marches.5 4
The Court has held, however, that although these forms of expression
are all entitled to protection, different modes of expression present
different problems. It does not necessarily follow that each mode is
the wife or daughter of the owner of the establishment in which she was to work. This
was challenged under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court said that the twenty-first amendment does not supercede the fourteenth, even in the
area of regulation of liquor; but in recognition of the special problems connected with the
sale of liquor, the Court could not hold that the regulation presented an unreasonable
classification. See also Note, The Twenty-First Amendment Grants States Plenary Power
Over the Liquor Industry Notwithstanding the Dictates of the Equal Employment Provi-
sions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 587 (1971).
47. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1963).
48. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
49. 409 U.S. at 119.
50. See text corresponding to note 87 infra.
51. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). See generally Note, Motion Pictures and the
First Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 696 (1951).
52. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 819 U.S. 624 (1943).
53. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 8 (1939). See generally International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
54. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1964).
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subject to the precise rules laid down for dealing with some other
mode. 55 The Court has held that as expression moves from the printed
page and takes the form of conduct, such communicative conduct may
be subject to some state regulation.56
The regulations at issue in La Rue deal with three forms of expres-
sion: motion pictures, dance, and other live performances. As stated
above, the Court held in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,5 7 that motion
pictures were entitled to first amendment protection. However, the
Court had never directly ruled on the issues of dance and live theatrical
performances prior to the La Rue s decision, where it was specifically
held that theatrical performances are entitled to first amendment
protection, and strongly implied that dance is protected as well. 59
Previously, state and lower federal courts had been in general agree-
ment that live theatrical performances were entitled to some degree
of first amendment protection. The split of authority was on the issue
of whether such performances could be dissected into speech and non-
speech components. The District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, for example, held that the nonverbal elements of a play may
not be regulated on a different basis than the verbal elements.60 The
court said that a play must be considered as a unit for the purpose of
determining obscenity. In a contrary holding, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee, dealing with the same play, held that
the speech and nonspeech elements could be separated for the purposes
of determining obscenity.6' That court said that speech elements must
be judged in the context of the play as a whole, and the Roth-Memoirs
tests applied on that basis. The nonspeech elements of the play were
to be judged independently. They could be found obscene when ex-
55. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
56. California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972).
57. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
58. The Court in La Rue cites Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1969), as authority
for the proposition that live theatrical performances are protected. But that case held
only that Congress could not prohibit the wearing of a military uniform by an actor who
said things critical of the military on stage, while allowing the wearing of the uniform if
he did not. The Court said, "An actor, like anyone else in our country, enjoys a constitu-
tional right to freedom of speech, including the right to openly criticize the government."
Id. at 63.
59. The court of appeals of Arizona construed the language in La Rue as holding that
dance was an activity entitled to prima facie first amendment protection, and struck down
an ordinance prohibiting topless dancing in any circumstances. See Yauch v. Arizona,
19 Ariz. App. 175, 505 P.2d 1066 (1973).
60. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
61. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). See
also Note, Dissection of Theatrical Plays into Speech and Conduct Components: An Ex-
ception to the Roth Rule?, 4 S] rON HALL L. Rav. .379 (1972).
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amined individually, and yet not necessarily be obscene when viewed
in the context of the entire play.
The issue of whether dance is per se protected by the first amendment
has been the subject of much litigation in state and federal courts.
Most of the cases have involved nude and partially nude dancing in
bars and nightclubs. Approaches used by various courts generally place
the degree of protection to be given to such dance in one or more of
five general categories:
(a) The right to sell liquor is a temporary privilege granted by the
state. Since it is a business attended by danger to the community, it may
be permitted under such circumstances as will limit to the utmost its
evil. Therefore, revocation of a liquor license on grounds that enter-
tainment presented was lewd and immoral is justified as a reasonable
exercise of supervisory power. No showing of obscenity is required.62
(b) Topless dancing in bars is conduct particularly devoid of commu-
nicative elements, as is pure conduct. As such, it is not entitled to first
amendment protections per se.63
(c) Where expression is used not to disseminate opinion or informa-
tion, but to sell a product, such expression is not entitled to stringent
first amendment protection.64 As a sales promotion device, topless
dancing is subject to state regulation. Neither the Roth-Memoirs
standards for dealing with obscenity, nor the O'Brien standards are
applicable. 65
(d) Dance is an activity which has both speech and nonspeech ele-
ments. In circumstances where the speech elements are merely inci-
62. In the Matter of Club "D" Lane, Inc., 112 N.J. 577, 272 A.2d 302 (1971); Tahiti
Bar, Inc., Liquor License Case, 395 Pa. 355, 142 A.2d 491 (1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S.
85 (1959).
63. Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504 (D. Neb. 1971) (involving revocation of a liquor
license for displaying topless dancers. The ordinance of the City of Omaha provided for the
revocation or suspension of liquor license if "... . the licensee, his manager or agent, shall
allow any live person to appear . . .in any licensed premises in a state of nudity . . .);
Jones v. City of Birmingham, 45 Ala. 86, 224 So. 2d 922, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1969)
(prosecution under a statute prohibiting ". . . any person to publicly engage or participate
in ... any indecent, obscene, lewd, filthy, vulgar, or lascivious scene, act, posture, or per-
formance, or for any person in charge ... of any building or premises to permit the
same to be done therein ....").
64. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
65. Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504 (D. Neb. 1971); City of Portland v. Derrington,
253 Ore. 289, 451 P.2d 111 (1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969) (involving prosecution
of a topless dancer under the Portland Police Code which makes it ". . . unlawful for
any female person to appear or be in a place where food or alcoholic beverage is offered
for sale for consumption on the premises, so costumed or dressed that one or both breasts
are wholly or substantially exposed to public view").
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dental to the activity, the activity is not protected; the states may
prescribe permissible degrees of nudity in bars, and are not limited in
so doing to the standards for obscenity. In circumstances where the
speech elements are significant, however, the Roth-Memoirs tests will
have to be met. 66
(e) Dance is a constitutionally protected form of expression, and nude
or partially nude dancing may not be prohibited without a showing of
obscenity.67
The majority in La Rue treated dance and other live performances
in bars and nightclubs as one question. It did not rule directly on the
issue of whether this entertainment can be separated into speech and
nonspeech elements for the purpose of determining obscenity. It held
that the state was not limited in this case to dealing with the problem
in terms of obscenity at all.
Justice Rehnquist conceded that at least some of the performances
at which the regulations were directed are constitutionally protected,
but he said that they "partake more of gross sexuality than of com-
munication." 68 He cited O'Brien as holding that the extent to which
conduct is protected depends on the presence of a communicative
element. 69 Because these performances were prohibited only in bars
and nightclubs, and not across the board, they were upheld. What this
provides, in effect, is a sliding scale of protection depending on the
extent of the communicative element contained in the performance.
This result is a significant departure from the holding in O'Brien.
There, it was recognized that the presence of communicative and non-
communicative elements may exist on a sliding scale, in relationship
of one to the other, within a single activity. The Court held that there
is a point on this scale at which the first amendment line is drawn;
66. Paladino v. City of Omaha, 335 F. Supp. 897 (D. Neb. 1972) (involving revocation
of a liquor license for displaying topless dancers in violation of an Omaha City Ordi-
nance); Hoffman v. Carson, 49 Ala. 3d 1078, 250 So. 2d 891 (1971) (involving prosecution
under a Florida indecent exposure statute); Majors Liquors, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 188
Neb. 628, 198 N.W.2d 483 (1972) (involving revocation of a liquor license for displaying
topless dancers in violation of an Omaha city ordinance).
67. In re Gianinni, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, cert. denied, 395
U.S. 910 (1968) (involving prosecution of a topless dancer under an indecent exposure
statute); Glancy v. County of Sacramento, 94 Cal. Rptr. 864, 17 Cal. App. 3d 504 (1971)
(involving prosecution of a bottomless waitress under a county ordinance which declared
that any person is ".... guilty of a misdemeanor who ... exposes his or her private parts
or buttocks ... while participating in any live act ... in any public place . . . or serving
food or drink or both to any customer").
68. 409 U.S. at 118.
69. 391 U.S. at 376.
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conduct on one side is protected, and on the other side it is not. Once
this threshold is reached, the full force of the first amendment applies.70
III. THE OVERBREADTH DoIrgINE
Perhaps the most significant aspect of La Rue is the majority's ap-
proach to the problem that possible future applications of the regula-
tions might present issues of constitutional dimension. The problem of
which the Court speaks is the problem of possible statutory over-
breadth.71 Because the fourteenth amendment requires that the full
force of the first amendment apply to the states in the area of freedom
of expression, the states are severely limited in the exercise of their
general police power when dealing with matters affecting speech. The
Court has precisely defined the circumstances under which freedom of
speech may be restricted, and has also defined, with slightly less preci-
sion, circumstances under which conduct having both speech and non-
speech elements may be regulated. A state regulation which prohibits
both activities which are protected by the first amendment and activi-
ties which are not protected is said to be "overbroad." A state regula-
tion which regulates activities which are prima facie protected, and so
regulates them in both circumstances which warrant regulation and
those which do not, is also "overbroad." 72
The Court has developed two alternative methods for dealing with
overbroad statutes. The more traditional approach is to deal with them
on a "case-by-case" basis, allowing the statute to operate in circum-
stances which the Constitution permits, and prohibiting its application
to protected activities.7 3 A more drastic approach is to declare the
statute unconstitutional "on its face" because of its adverse affects on
the exercise of freedom of expression.7 4
If a statute is declared unconstitutional on its face, the statute is
void and may not be applied to any situation. In dealing with a claim
of first amendment privilege using the case-by-case approach, the Court
first examines a statute on the basis of due process requirements. The
70. In O'Brien, the Court assumed that the threshold had been reached, and did not
establish a test to determine at what point to draw the line.
71. The vice of statutory vagueness, in the area of first amendment protection, is often
intimately related to the vice of overbreadth. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. R.v. 67 (1960).
72. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv.
844 (1970).
73. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
74. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1939).
1020
Vol. 12: 1008, 1974
Recent Decisions
due process provisions of the fourteenth amendment protect citizens
of a state from an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of
the general police power. If the statute is held to be constitutional
under the due process clause, it then remains for the Court to deter-
mine whether the particular conduct at issue was protected by the first
amendment.75 This procedure allows the Court to define, one by one,
the circumstances in which the statute may operate consistently with
the first amendment and those in which it may not. The primary ra-
tionale for this approach is that constitutional adjudication tends to
err unless confined to the evaluation of factual data generated by a
particular case. A second rationale is the doctrine that constitutional
issues should be decided as narrowly as possible. This is based on the
concept that the courts should avoid confrontation with the legislature
whenever possible. When such a confrontation is not avoidable, it
should be as limited as possible.76 In applying the case-by-case approach
the courts assume that privileged claimants will be vindicated and
claimants whose activities are not protected will not be shielded by
constitutional safeguards which do not apply to their cases.
In attacking a statute on its face, it is not necessary that the party
claiming the statute is overbroad show that his conduct was privi-
leged.77 The Court has held that the claim of overbreadth is available
to a claimant whose conduct was itself subject to regulation under a
properly narrow scheme. All that the claimant must show is that the
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, and if so found, it may not be
applied. Facial examination of statutes has been applied by different
justices in different ways, but the basic rationale for its use has always
been the same-the preferred position of first amendment rights. The
argument is that the very existence of an overbroad statute has a
"chilling effect" on the exercise of first amendment rights. A statute
that has an overbroad scope operates as a deterrent to the exercise of
rights that are prohibited by the statute but would be found protected
if tested through the courts.78 In weighing the valid state interest to be
achieved by a statute against the chilling effect on free expression, the
75. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
76. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 85 HARV. L. REv. 844, 847-
52 (1970).
77. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1964).
78. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAM. L. REv.
844, 852-59 (1970).
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Court has declared statutes void on their faces for the following
reasons: 
79
(a) because the means employed bore little relation to the interest
sought to be advanced80; or
(b) because the state interest could be attained by alternate means
that would impose less drastic restrictions on the individual's personal
liberty8 l; or
(c) because the state interest served was deemed insufficient to justify
the extensive restrictions.8 2
The doctrine that a statute affecting free expression is unconstitu-
tional on its face if overbroad is the approach that has been much
favored by the Court in recent years. This has been particularly true
in the Court's attitude toward statutes that regulate time, place, and
manner for expression.8 3 The Court has made it clear that when speech
and nonspeech elements combine in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element may justify incidental limitations on first amendment
rights.84 When dealing with a statute that, on its face, does not regulate
speech, but rather deals with conduct, and, when the governmental
interest which supports the statute is other than the suppression of free
expression, the Court will deal on a case-by-case basis with the applica-
tion of such a statute to a situation that involves communication.8 5
When dealing with a statute that directly regulates activities entitled
to prima facie first amendment protection, however, the Court has
required that "precision be the touchstone."'8 6 The Court has held that
only a compelling governmental interest will justify regulations on the
time, place, and manner of expression, and only regulations reasonably
related to those interests will be permitted. 7 Further, it has held that
the regulations must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. In
79. Isreal, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 193, 217-19.
80. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960);
Lovell v. Griffin, 304 U.S. 444 (1938).
81. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
82. Louisiana ex tel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
83. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1964).
84. United States v. O'Brien, 391 US. 367, 376-77 (1968).
85. Id.
86. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
87. Id. at 438. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963); Bates v. little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex.rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464
(1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
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other words, regulations of this type must be written in terms such that
they are capable of applications only in circumstances which the Con-
stitution allows.s8 Overbroad regulations will be struck down on their
faces.
As the facial examination for overbreadth became the rule in examin-
ing statutes directly affecting freedom of expression, the Court has in
some instances applied the test for overbreadth without looking to see
which form of adjudication, facial or case-by-case, was most suited to
dealing with the issue. At one time the Court felt that the drastic
approach was justified only if not doing so would have a serious chilling
effect on first amendment rights.8 9 More recent cases have indicated that
a finding of overbreadth is conclusive, and the statute must be held
void on its face. Some of these cases rejected the case-by-case approach
for reasons that had little to do with chilling effects.90
There have been indications, prior to La Rue, that the Court is
re-examining the overbreadth doctrine. In Younger v. Harris,91 the
Court severely limited the doctrine that federal courts should enjoin
state proceedings on the basis that the statute involved was unconstitu-
tional on its face. While the holding in that case was limited to a
situation in which the state proceeding had already commenced, the
Court indicated a similar preference for abstention even in the absence
of a pending state proceeding. Gooding v. Wilson92 was indicative of
the difference of opinion that existed on the Court in 1971. In dealing
with a Georgia breach of the peace statute, Mr. Justice Brennan spoke
for the majority: ". . . [the statute] punishes only spoken Words. It can
therefore withstand appellee's attack upon facial constitutionality only
if, as authoritatively construed by the Georgia courts, it is not suscepti-
ble of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is pro-
tected by the first amendment. ' 93 In other words, the statute must be
88. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1971). See also United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 143-50 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
89. See generally Note, Chilling Effects in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808
(1969).
90. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1962). The Court feared that the statute
might be used selectively against unpopular causes, and that lower courts might not re-
solve statutory ambiguities in favor of adequate protection of first amendment rights.
91. Compare Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), with Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1964). See Kennedy, I Used To Love You, But It's All Over Now: Abstention
and the Federal Courts' Retreat from their Role as Primary Guardian of First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 847 (1972).
92. 405 U.S. 518 (1971).
93. Id. at 520.
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carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only un-
protected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected
expression.94 Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting opinion, said:
As the Court itself recognizes, if the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine serves any legitimate purpose, it is to allow the Court
to invalidate statutes because their language demonstrates their
potential for sweeping improper applications posing significant
likelihood of deterring important First Amendment speech-not
because of some insubstantial or imagined potential for occas-
sional and isolated applications which go beyond constitutional
bounds .... The Court makes a mechanical and, I suggest insensi-
tive, application of the overbreadth doctrine today.95
In La Rue, Justice Rehnquist said that by pretrial stipulation, re-
spondents admitted that they had offered entertainment that was pro-
scribed by the Department's regulations. The Court had before it
testimony as to the substance of that entertainment. Also, by pre-trial
stipulation, the Department indicated its intent to take disciplinary
action against these licensees. Justice Rehnquist concluded that this
represented a concrete and present constitutional controversy9" and
therefore the district court had jurisdiction in the case. By framing the
jurisdictional issue in this way, the Court had a specific course of
conduct to examine. By looking to the public hearings and statements
by the Department, Justice Rehnquist found that this was typical of
the type of conduct at which the regulations could be expected to be
aimed in the future.
Justice Rehnquist agreed with the minority that, on their faces,
the regulations would prohibit some entertainment that was clearly
protected. He indicated that even in the context of licensing the sale
of liquor, California could not constitutionally prohibit all entertain-
ment that would seem to come within the definitions of the rules, if it
allowed entertainment in bars at all. He said, however, that if Cali-
fornia should apply these rules in such a manner "it will be time
enough to consider such problems when they arise. '97
This decision indicates that the view of the overbreadth doctrine
that would automatically hold void on its face a statute suffering from
any degree of overbreadth no longer commands a majority of the Court.
94. Id. at 522.
95. Id. at 530-31 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
96. 409 U.S. at 113 n.3.
97. Id. at 119 n.5.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in La Rue holds that in the setting of a bar or night-
club, the twenty-first amendment empowers a state to regulate some
activities that are entitled to prima facie constitutional protection. The
permissible scope and extent of such power is left to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. The Court, however, has given little indication as to
what sort of standard is to be used.
Richard C. Lane
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